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The current pro fessiona l  interes t in exper imental economics 
seems to s t em in part f rom a recently acquired abil i t y  o f  eco nom i et e  to 
explore subtle imp l ica t ions of ins t i tutional details for market perfo rmance 
Ad vances in unders tand ing the rol e  of informa t ion in market models suggest 
the pos s ib il ity tha t  the contribu t ion of inetitutio n e  in a f f ec t ing infor-
ma t ion pa t t erns and resource a lloca t ion can be iden t i f ied and a eeeeeed . 
Game theory has increas ingly focused upon the s truc ture o f  strategy epacee 
as  d ictated by special ins t i tu t iona l  etruc turee. The d iscovery o f  the 
theoret ical ex istence of decentra l ized incentive compat ible  proces �ee for 
the pro vis ion o f  pub l ic goods allows one to specula t e  about t he po eeibil i ty 
o f  many d i f f erent typee o f  ins t i t u t ions wh ich m ight eo lve the public
goods and f ree r ider problems . The cont inued growth and development o f  
the f ield o f  law and economics h a e  d irec t ed the theo ry toward t h e  etudy 
o f  the rel a t ionship between legal t echnology and economic pr inciples . 
Theo ret ical works on the nature o f  ins t i tu t ions end po s s ible mani f  eetations  
o f  their infl uence f ill the j ournals . 
Two problems accompany these academic exchanges and emphasize 
the need for data such as those generated by experimental methods ,  Firs t ,  
many d i f ferent theories compete i n  pro viding pred ict ions about the 
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consequences o f  ins t i tu t ional change . Such theor ies are genera t ed 
from a variety o f  sources (e . g . , sma l l  changes in the mAthematical  
represent a t ion of a n  ins t i tu tion or o f  the ind ividua lis t ic behaviora l 
response within an ins t i tutiona l  env ironment can produce drama tic 
d i fferences in pred icted sys tem behavio r), Secondl y , his tory is no t 
always cooperat ive in crea ting c ircums tances which s epara t e  the 
predic t ions o f  theories.  Two theor ies may have drama t ica lly d i ffering 
pred ic t ions within all fu ture scena r io s ,  bu t within a ll past  cond i t ions 
their pred ic t io ns might be a lmos t  iden t ical . Thu s ,  historic a l  ci rcum­
s tances do no t a lways provide the opportunity fo r the rela t ively 
inaccura te models  to be pruned from the tree of v iable hypo theses . 
These two prob lems are compounded by the sheer complexity 
o f  na turally occurr ing processes , Da t a  are frequent ly buried. Ma ny 
variables intervene . Furthermore,  scholars o f  ins t i tu tions a nd their 
consequences approach the subject with d i fferent preconcep t ions , 
exper ience, int u i t ion , a nd academic d iscipl inary back ground and can 
accord ingly be l ed to subs tant ially d i fferent in terpretat ions of such 
data tha t e xis t .  Reso lution of compe t i ng ideas can take years i f  no t 
decades . 
Exper imental methods prov ide a source o f  shared exper ienc e 
fo r scho lars who are  developing and evaluating theori es about comp lica ted 
na tura l l y  occurr ing processes . Whi le laboratory processes are simp le 
in c omparis on to natura lly occurring processes , they are rea l processes 
in the sense that rea l  people part icipate for rea l and su bs t antial prof Its 
a nd fo llow r ea l  rules in do ing s o. It is prec isely because they a re rea l  
that they are i nteres ti ng. Ge nera l theories mu st apply t o  spec ia l cases , 
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so mod els bel ieved to be appl icab l e  to co mpl ic a ted na tura ll y  occurr ing 
processes sh ould certainly be expec ted to help explain wha t occurs in 
s imp l e ,  spec ia l -case l abo ratory markets . Theo r i es which do not apply 
to the special  cases are no t genera l theo r ies and thus canno t be 
advo cated as  such . 
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Labora to ry d a t a  become rel evant to the extent tha t  que s t io ns 
can be posed which make the s tudy o f  spec ial  cases relevant . It may 
no t be po s s ib le to l earn about compl icated processes d irec tly by 
rec rea t ing them in a labora tory . General Motors , with a l l  i t s  s i ze and 
ins t i t u t iona l  comp lexity , canno t be recrea t ed many times for the 
convenience of those who wish to know wha t  m ight have happened had one 
of i t s  fea tu res been a l t ered . St i l l ,  one might be able to l ea rn something 
about competing models of a compl ica ted p rocess by ga i ning exper ience 
with their accuracy in s imple cases , Circums tances in which models tend 
to be less rel iab l e  can be identified and , t o  the ex tent that the 
pred ictions of a model a re accura te over a wide range o f  l abora tory 
c i rcums tances , one ga ins some confidence in their accuracy when a �pl ied to 
the mo re compl ica ted , na tura lly occurr ing c i rcums tances . 
EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONS RELATIVE TO INDUSTRIA L ORGANIZATION THEORY 
The specia l  cases reviewed here a r e  those which have been of 
impo rtance to  indus t rial organiza t ion theo r i s t s .  Figure 1 helps place 
them in a proper context by showing diagra rrma t ical l y  how the exper imental 
qu est ions are related to those of more trad i t ional co ncern. The flow o f  
the theory a nd t h e  methodological perspec tive ls cons is tent with that 
d eveloped by Scherer (1971, pp. 3-7). The d ia gram is ta ken from Scherer
with a few cha nges imposed to highli ght the particula r  l inks which 
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exper imenta t ion has been used to exp lo re,  Var iables which contribu t e  
5 
to the nature o f  market demand cos t s ,  the psycho log ica l makeup o f  co nsumers,  
produ ction techno lo gy as d ictated by the phys ica l prope r t ies o f  the  co tmnodity 
and engineering and man agement kno wled ge,  resource ava ilability , e t c. are 
lis ted in the ca tegory of "bas ic condit ions . " Trad it io na l  theory provides 
an ana ly s is o f  ho w the bas ic cond it ions t end to inf luence indus t r ia l  
s t ructure ( the number and s ize o f  f irms , co s t  structures , degree o f  inte-
gra t ion,  etc, ) .  This inf luence is represented by the dark arro w. The 
theory then co n t inues to exp lore ho w industria l  s tructure when combined 
with p r incip les of e conom ic behavior d icta t e  condu ct and perfo rmance .  
Wit h in t h is f ramework t he specia l cases exp lo red with laboratory 
too ls can best be ident if ied by add ing a no ther cat egory d ra wing variab les 
f rom both the t rad it iona l conduct ca tegory and the basic cond it ions ca tegory . 
These variables are those which cha racter ize the mar ke t  ins t itu t iona l  enviro n-
men t .  They a r e  t h e  ru les and organiza t ional s tructures which govern pr icing 
and purchase d e cis ions . In some cases they m ight be identif ied as aspects 
of  mana geriel s ty le and thus p la ced in the bas ic condit ions cat ego ry . In 
o ther ca ses they may be ident if ied a e  aspe cts o f  the genera l marke t ing 
s tra tegies o f  firms and thus be lis ted a s  part o f  conduct ( e . g. ,  pr ice pos t ing) 
St ill, in other ca ses they are d icta t ed by sour ces e xterna l  to the industry 
such as gover nmental regu la tory po licies o r  a s  in the ca se of the secu r it ies 
industry by the po licies of another indus try ( e . g. ,  the s to ck exchanges) 
which specia lize in prov id ing marketing serv ice s .  The particu lar market 
ins t itutions wh ich have been studied so f ar are listed in the nex t section.  
Labora tory s tud ies have focu sed upon ho w indus tria l  structure a nd 
market ins t itutions inf luence conduct d e f ined in terms o f  price pa tterns and 
resource a llo ca t io n  and a lso ho w the two ca tego r ies inf luence performance 
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d efined in t erms of income distribution and efficiency (the dark arrows), 
The l ink which has not yet been explored sys tema tically is the influence of 
market s truc ture on market ins titutional var iables . No doubt in time this 
link will receive a t t ention.  Its  impor tance is  widely recognized but  it  
does pose problems for experimental methods as  discussed in  the concluding 
sec tion, Nevertheless the reader should be aware of the l imited scope of 
existing results so they can be placed in a proper context, 
Because labora to ry s tudies focus upon particular l inks , they 
are special cases for the general theories which explain all the interac tions , 
feedbacks (as represented by the dotted l ines in the Figure) and influences 
among all three groups of variables : indus tr ial s truc ture, market inst itutions, 
and conduc t .  Within the general theory certain types of industrial struc tures 
are thought to direc tly influence market ins titutions (cartel organiza tions , 
for example, are thought to be more l ikely in markets with few firms) and 
then the market ins titutio ns once d eveloped induce feedback effec ts which 
operate to change the industr ial s tructure (e. g . , firm size), Thu s ,  the 
theory is appl ied to expla in how bo th types of variables will evolve and , 
while evolving, will jointly influence market conduc t ,  Experimental s tudies 
have t ended to use this last  l ink of the general theory as a guide to wha t 
to look for in the behavior of simple indus tr ies (relative to the naturally 
occurring indus tries), In mos t  experimental work the basic conditions , 
the indus tr ial s truc ture ,  and the market ins titutions are all exogenously 
determined trea tment variabl es , All are held cons tant while the resul t ing 
condu c t  is observed so the j o int influences of indus trial s tructure and 
market ins titutions on conduct and performance can be ascertained and 
unders tood in terms of the theories as applied to those  circumstances, 
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THE SURVEY 
Three broad general iza tions seem to charac terize observations 
drawn from laboratory environments . Firs t ,  the s tandard mathema tical models 
(wi th certain exceptions and qualificatio ns) appear to apply with extraordinary 
accuracy , Basic principles of economics do seem to be o perat ing. Secondly, 
there is a s trong interaction between market ins titutions and industrial 
s tructure in determining market conduct and perfo rmance .  The applicable 
model seems to shift with ins titutional changes . Third , successful collusions 
observed so far tend to involve the adop tion of some type of ins titu t ional 
enforcement mechanism. Extramarket communica tions , for example, s eem to be 
useful in establishing procedures and prac t ices which can have an independent 
effec t  on prices , The success of a t temp ts to collude seem to be related ,  in 
par t ,  to success in es tablishing effec tive procedures . 
The fac t tha t interac t ions exist between industrial s truc ture 
and market ins titutio ns poses an expo sitional problem. The number and 
var iety of market ins titutions found in the world are s tagger ing . When 
considered along with the different types of indus trial s truc tures,  the 
po s s ible combinations become large . The s trategy o f  experimentalists for 
understanding them has been to identify the mos t  prominent forms of market 
ins t itu t ions and then to s tudy the special varia tions . We have 
partitio ned experiments into two general classes . The fir s t  class 
conta ins ins titu t io ns and procedures in which there are no opportunities 
for decision makers to communica t e  o ther than through the ord inary 
ac tivities of buying and sell ing . In the second class we explore 
the decisions made within ins titutions which allow " extramarket" 
communica tions . In these processes some part icipants (conspirators) 
can make plans , commi tments and /or agr eements a bo ut the ac tions they 
will take in the market, 
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Fiv e pro minen t  forms o f  ma rket inat i tut io na hav e been stud i ed 
in the exp er imental l i terature: (a) a uc t ion ma rkets , ( b) pos ted bid 
(o f f er) ma rkets , ( c )  negotiated pri c e  ( t el ephone) market s ,  ( d )  p r ic e  
protec t io tl and advanc e no tice po l ic ies ,  The f i f th,  s ealed bid (o f f er) 
ma rkets, will no t be r ev i ewed h er e.2 
Ac t ua l l y ,  the l is t ing of onl y  f ive d i f f er ent typ es involves an 
oversimpl i f ica t ion.  Each of  thes e  types can be s ubd ivided f urther into 
spec ia l  typee. Auction markets , for exampl e, can be either Engl ish o r  
Dutch acco rd ing t o  wh ether t h e  prices s tart  l o w  and are bid up by 
co mpetit ion o r  s tart  h igh and are r ed uc ed unt il some co mpetitor acc ep t s .  
Engl ish auc tions can b e  "doubl e ora l "  or  "one aided ." Markets d i f f er 
according to whether o r  no t th e t erms o f  contrac t &  are publ i c  a nd the 
s eq uenc e  in which bid s ,  o f f ers , and t er ms beoo me known. Th e poss i bi l i t i es 
are so r ich tha t  i t  so meti mes s eems mor e  appropriate to think in t er ms 
o f  a continuum rather than f ix ed classes.  For examp l e, po s ted price
auctions look v ery s i milar to  " s eal ed bid "  auc tions i f  s el l ers mus t 
pos t prices witho ut th e knowl edge of other prices and witho ut the 
a bil ity to imm ed i a t ely " adj us t "  prices in l ight o f  the co mpeti t ion. 
In add i t ion to ind us trial s truc tur e and th e ma rket insti tutional 
env iro mnent,  s i t ua t ions can d i f f er accord ing to the g eneral info r ma tion 
o f  participants . Ag ents may or may no t be a wa r e  of the options or th e 
payo f fs o f  o th er s .  Th er e may also be d i f f er enc es a bo ut th e kno wl edge 
a bo ut o thers ' kno wl ed g e, So the read er can s ee that relative to wha t  
one wo uld l ike to kno w, the number o f  stud i es covered belo w i s  mod es t  
indeed ,  
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THE ABSENCE OF EXTRAMARKET COMMUNICATION 
Th e behavior o f  t h e  four d i f f er ent types o f  market ins t i t utions 
l i s t ed a bov e wil l  be r eviewed, It s eems fair to say that none of thes e  
d i f f er en t  typ es o f  market ins t i tutions hav e been explo r ed in s uf f ic i en t  
d etail to prov id e d ef in i tive s ta t ements a bo ut the infl uence o f  a wid e  
vari ety o f  basic econo mic cond i t ions s uch as  d emand elasticities and 
ind us trial s truc t ures . Nev er thel es s ,  the number of exp er imental cond i t ions 
has been s uf f ic i ently rich to admi t  so me co mpar isons and r easona bl e 
conj ec t ur es a bo ut wha t more systema t ic s tud i es wil l  rev ea l ,  Th e market 
s tud i es r evi ewed in this s ec tion maintained s trict  control over communics t io
In moat cases pa rticipants wer e in the sa me roo m  but co nmiunfra t ion was 
l imit ed to the making o f  bid e  and o f f er s ,  etc . as allo wed by the tech nology 
of t rad ing, 
A. Th e Oral Auction Market 
Oral a uc t io n  markets a r e  charac t er i zed by p ubl ic bid e  (o f f ers)  
to buy ( s el l )  uni t s  and  the f r eedo m of  any par tic ipant to accept t er ms 
which ( s ) h e  wishes . Sev eral variants exist  d ep ending upon the l ength 
of t i me o r  c irc ums tanc�e under which a bid ( o f f er)  r ema ins o uts tand ing, 
wheth er the bid (o f f er)  is mad e  orally or logg ed thro ugh a co mp ut er ,  
the rol l  o f  the special i s t  1 a " book, 11 etc .  
Th e overwhelming r es ul t  i s  that thes e  markets converge to t h e  
compet i tive eq uil i br i um. Figur e  2 is typical o f  the time pat tern o f  prices .  
Sho wn ther e is the price o f  ev ery sal e i n  the ord er i n  which i t  occ urr ed ,  
Each p er iod r epres ents a market day wi th a given d emand and s upply.  The 
co mp eti t iv e  eq uil i brium i a  $2 wi th a vol ume p er p eriod o f  eight con trac ts . 
Aa ma rket days are r ep l icated und er id ent ical cond i t ions,  prices t end to 
converge to the competi t ive eq uil ibri um. Ef f i c i ency l evel s  tend to 
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converge to near 100 percent. If a change in parame ters had occu rred , 
such as a shift in demand or in supply, the prices would have converged 
to the new equilibr ium af ter two or three periods. 
AB long as the industr ial structure has a few buyers and sellers , 
these convergence and efficiency properties appear to be independent of the 
basic economic conditions . Dif ferent shapes of demands and supplies as were 
systematically examined by Smith (1962, 1965 , 19 76a) yield no subs tantial 
differences . The variations explored covered various cases of demand 
elasticity and nonlineari t y .  In Smith (1965) a completely inelastic (in 
the relevant range) demand was used along with a fixed supply (greater than 
the quantity demanded). In all cases, af ter a few periods , the market 
performance was close to that predicted by the competit ive model,  
Other aspects o f  the basic economic conditions have been 
changed to allow for seasonality (Miller , Plott , Smith 1977; A. W. Williams 1979; 
Hof fman , Plo tt 1 981), middlemen (Plott, Uhl 1 981) ,
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and o ther features 
having to do wi th the time dimension of a commodity life . In all cases 
the competitive model is an accurate predictor of market behavior ,  The 
model, when assets are involved, mus t  be altered to acconunodat e  rational 
expectations (Fo rsythe, Palfrey, Plott 1981) and inside information as to 
asset returns (Plott , Sunder 1980), S t ill the empirical generalization 
is that with the o ral double auc tion the competitive model is an accurate 
predictor under all per turbations of  the basic economic condi t ions even 
though only three o r  four s�Jlers and/or buyers may be involved . 
Basic economic conditions do seem to influence the direction 
of convergence to equilibr ium and thus the distribution of income and 
prof it. The path to equilibrium seems to be from above (below) if 
consumer ' s  (producer ' s) surplus is greater than producer ' s  (co nsumer ' s) 
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s urplus ,  Th us , one might e xpe ct t hat markets with rela t ively steep demands 
and reasonably flat s up p l ies record somewhat elevated profits for the 
sellers relat ive to the compe t it ive eq uil ibrium , These prof it s  would accrue 
at d iseq uilibrium t rades and so the phenomenon would also be a ccompanied by 
fal l ing prices . I f  the ind ustry has been characterized by unant icipated 
demand or s upply s h ift s ,  pr ices and profits can be a f f e cted . Adj ustment t o  
ne w eq uilibriums takes t ime and profit s  o r  losses can certainly reflect 
d iseq uilibrium trades , To date only one s t udy has attemp ted to character ize 
the dynamic adj us tment path (Smith 1 9 65)  and the con cl usions from this are 
clouded (Nelson 19 80) , No good theory o f  adj us tment e xis t s  and e xper imental 
st ud ies have not yet e xp lo red the inf l uence o f  basic e con omic condit ions on 
adj us tment paths s ufficiently to provide any further generaliza t ions .  
Changes in the market ins t it ut ions a •e kno wn to in f l uence p rice 
and pro fit patterns . Do ub le a uct ions conducted by computer can a ffe ct the 
speed o f  convergence especially with ine xperienced participants (A ,  W ,  
Will iam a 19 80) , For s ingle unit a uctions d ifferences are exh ibited bet ween 
the Dut ch a uction , Eng l ish auct ion, and second price auct ion. Theore tica l ly 
(Nash b idding hypothes is )  the Engl ish and s e cond price a uct ion should yie ld 
the same reven ue while the Dut ch , assuming eome riek avers ion , should y ield  
more than both .  The fact ia, however ,  that  the Dut ch a uct ion y ields am ounts 
lees than or equa l  to  the other t wo ( Coppinger ,  Smith and Tit us 1 9 80) , The 
Dut ch a uct ion also yielded leae revenue than the f iret pr ice a uction which 
ie theoret ically s imilar , 
The m oat dramat ic d if ference wit hin the class of oral auct ion 
ina t it utiona occurs with the one a ided a uct ions ,  The approach t o  
eq uilibrium i e  from above (below) if the auct ion ia a one-aided ( o f fer) 
a uct ion. That ie, if buyers ( sellers) can b id (offer) wh ile aellere 
( b uyers ) mus t  a ccept o r  rej ect with out making co unter o f fers (bid s ), 
then the approach is f rom above (belo w) , The d is trib ution o f  income 
is aga ins t the aide wh ich art icula tes the t e nn a  ( Smith 1 9 64;  Plo t t ,  
Smith 1 9 78) , E xa ctly why thia o ccurs la no t known b ut no t ice the 
imp l ica t ion . Sel l ers who f a ce an oral a uct ion ins t it ut ion would 
1 3  
prefer tha t the b uyers b id .  To the e xtent sellers can o rganize themselves 
to compete by a ccep ting favorable b id e  and no t ma king co unter o f fers , 
the appro a ch to eq uil ibr ium and thus pro fits will be infl uenced in their 
favo r ,  Similarly,  ma rke t s  organized as  oral o ffer markets may have some 
use aa too l s  to co untera ct " unj us tified market powe�' of aellera. I t  le 
imp or tant to not e ,  h owever , tha t the nonmonopol ized o ne aided oral 
a uct ions e xamined to date have all been near 1 00 percent efficient .  
The ins tit ut ion a f f e cts only the d is t r ib ut ion o f  income , 
The imp ortan ce of ind us trial s t r ucture has no t been 
sys tema t ical ly e xplored , For one reason the res ul ts und er the o ral 
a uct ion ins t it ut ions appear to be a l mos t  ind ependent o f  ind us t r ial 
s t ruct ure , Exper imen ts with three and fo ur sellers converge with 
regul a r ity to the compe t it ive eq uil ibrium. I f  inf l uences fro m  ind us t r ial 
s tr ucture e xis t ,  they are no t so prono un ced as to be cl early detectabl e  
in exis t ing data, 
Monopol y  la the excep t ion to the l a c1t of a ttention.  In 
a r emarkabl e  aeries of e xper iments , Smith (19 81) d emon st rated the 
impo rtance of  ind us tria l  s t r uct ur e ,  Monopol ies can d e finitely ca use 
pr ices to d iverge f rom the compet itive eq uil ibr ium, Ho wever, the 
m onop ol y  model itsel f d id no t do so well .  There is a s t rong t endency 
for pr ices t o  erode a way from the monop oly eq uil ibr ium price , I n  
s ome cases the pr ice act ually approached the compe t it ive equil ibrium. 
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The number of observations so far is too small to determine which model 
is the bes t to modify .  Figure 3 reproduces the time series from a 
part icularly interesting exper iment which demonstrates the diff iculty 
with making any general s tatement abou t  the comparative accuracy o f  
the models . Prices s tart high near the monopoly price, erode t o  the 
competitive equilibrium, return to the high levels , and begin to erode 
again.  This interes ting behavior seems to be a t tr ibutable to the 
buyers who have considerable power under this ins titu t ion. By some 
process of 11counterspeculat ion11 they tend to withhold purchases and 
force prices down when facing a monopolis t in this arena . Exac tly 
what coordinates this action is unknown ( these buyers cannot communicate 
excep t through bids and o f fers) but, as will be shown below, certain 
ins t i tutions seem to prevent it  and therefore help the monopolis t .  
B. Nego tia ted Prices 
Nego tia ted price market ins titutions are those within which 
the terms of trade are privately nego tiated with each transact ion.  
Experimentally these conditions have been implemented through a telephone 
sys tem where buyers and sellers , each loc a ted in a private office, 
nego t ia te priva tely by telephone. Buyers can call sellers and vice 
versa and discuss terms and/or agree on a con tract price. Contact 
among buyers or among sellers is prevented . Consequently in these 
markets information about prices is no t public , Buyers can sho p among 
sellers and shopping cos t s  are low (in some experiments advertising is 
permi tted) but shopping and nego tia ting are the o nly sources o f  informat ion. 
The f irs t experiments o f  this kind were done by Hong and 
Plo t t  (1981 ) .  The dis t ribu tion of prices from one such experiment is 
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Source : Vernon L .  Smith. "An Empirical S tudy of Decent ralized 
Ins ti tutions of Monopoly Res traint . "  In Essays in Co ntempo rary 
Fields of Ecopomics , edited by Geo rge Horwich and James Quirk. 
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variance.  Evidently so me buyers are j u st be t ter nego t iators than o thers 
bu t the source of this (d ie) advantage ,  whether they shop more ( l e es ) , 
make more (less)  cred ibl e pro mises o r  threa t s, etc . ,  is unknown • 
With t ime the var iance shrinks . The mean p r ic e  approaches 
the co mpe titive equil ibrium. When d e mand shif t s  ( periods 5 and 9) the 
p r ices approach the new equil ibr iu m, E f f ic iency in these market s  is 
h igh as is ehown on the f igure , 
Only two d if ferent indus t r ial s tructures have been explored 
within this market ins t itution. The Hong and Plo t t  etudy ha� eleven 
buy ers of a bou t equal size , The twenty- two sell e r s, however, ranged 
fro m  very lar ge ( the f ive largest f ir ms had 60 percent o f  the marke t )  
to very small  sellers,  so me o f  whic h  should no t exist accord ing t o  
t h e  competit ive model because their costs were a bove t h e  c o mpetit ive 
equ il ibr iu m  p r ic e ,  As is impl ic it in the p r ice t ime ser ie s ,  the 
co mpet it ive model is reasonably accura t e .  The excep t ions were the 
mar ginal sel lers who were a bl e  to exis t  by sel l ing at pr ices a bove 
the co mpe t it ive equ il ibr iu m  p r ices to ( ev idently) poorly info rmed 
buyers or those who d id no t care to shop • 
The second s tudy is by Plo t t  ( 1 9 81 )  who stud ied tel ephone 
market s  with two large sellers ( 3 5  percent each) and two sma l l  sellers 
(15  percent each) . Sellers in the exper iment even had accura t e  k nowledge 
o f  the market demand func t ions,  The avera ge p r ices a e  ehown for all
periods on  Figure 5 are typical o f  the  general reeu l t e, S imilar to the 
Hong and Plo t t  resu l ts p r ices s tart  with a h igh variance.  W it h  t ime,  
variance ie reduced and the comp e t it ive equ il ibr iu m  ie approac hed , 
0 
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C ,  Pos ted Prices 
The p os ted pric e  ins titu tion has r ec eived mor e scholarly 
a tten tion than any other,  Frequ entl y ,  however ,  thos e c onduc ting the 
research d id not v iew themselves as en ga ged in a c ompara tiv e  ins titutional 
anal ysis ,  The origina l duop oly exp eriments of Fouraker and Siegel (1963) 
u til ized the p os ted p r ice ins titu tion . Almos t all  " ma rket ga mes" and 
" p r is oner's d ilemma "  exper iments can be interpreted as  having p oat<?o.I prices , 
However,  before reviewing duop ol y  perhaps it is be at to r ev iew th e two 
p olar cases of " many" sellers and on e sel ler , 
Two general iza tions seem p os s ibl e  a t  this time, Th e moat 
s ignificant general iza tion is tha t  p os ted of f er ( bid ) ma rkets tend to 
hav e h igher ( l ower )  p r ices than d o  oral d ou ble auc tion markets . Secondly , 
ef f ic iency tends to be l ower under the p os ted pric e  ins titutions than 
under the oral d ou bl e auc tions , 
These tendenc ies wer e  f irst observa bl e  in exp er iments run 
by F, Wil l ia ma ( 1 9 73 )  who inc orrec tl y  th ou ght they wer e due to the fact 
tha t  his traders c ould buy or s el l  mor e  than one unit, The r esul ts of 
two of his experiments a r e  s hown in Figure 6 ,  These show the cumula tiv e  
v olume of trades a t  each p r ic e  ( e. g., the curve indica tes th e nu mber of 
trades a t  p r ic e  P or a bove), P r ic es at f irst are removed fr om equ il ibrium 
bu t with time they d r if t  to c l os e  to the equ il ibr iu m. Whether or not 
p os ted pric e  markets ev er s ta bil ize a t  th e c ompetitive equ il ibr ium is 
an open ques tion . Certa inly this d oes not occur within th e nu mber of 
per iods charac teris tically nec essary for oral auc tions , 
The IHl l is ms '  r esul ts wer e  rep l icated by Pl ott and S mith ( 1 9 78 )  
who a l s o  de mons tr ated tha t the ma rket ins titu tion and not mul tiple units 
is the caus e ,  The poss ibl e imp ortance of bas ic ma rke t c ond itions and 
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WILLIAMS ' RESULTS : 
•••••••· SELLER'S POST OFFERS 
- BUYER'S PO�>T BIDS 
CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF TRADES WITH MULTIUNIT INCENTIVES* 
*The f igure represents for each price p*, the volume of trades
which took place at a price p _'.'._ p*.
Source :  Charles R. Plo t t  and Vernon L .  Smi th. "An Experimental
Examina t ion of Two Exchange Ins t i tutions . "  Review of Economic
S tudies 45 (February 1978):135
w n 
Hong and Plo t t  (1977) . In the former pos ted prices in markets wi th s torage 
and speculation were s tudied. In the latter s tudy thirty- three sellers 
were involved as opposed to the four in all o ther experiments. The two 
general iza tions were observed to hold in all cases. 
The Plott  and Smith experiments and many subsequent experiment s  
used people a s  buyers who could withhold purchases and play favori tes t o  
encourage low prices . The Williams experiment on the other hand u t ilized a 
computer in some sessions to simulate demanders according to the following 
s tr&.tegy: firs t, purchase from the low priced seller all s (he) wished 
to s el l  and then move to the next low priced seller, continuing until 
excess demand does not exis t .  One o f  the principal discoveries o f  
Plo t t  and Smith was that their demanders behaved passively (or purely 
compet i tively) almo s t  exac tly like the Will iams compu ter. This sugges ts 
that one of  the major fea tures of  the po s ted ins titution is that the 
"power" of  the nonpos ting side is somehow eliminated. From an intuit ive 
point of view one can see tha t when facing pos ted prices , abs tinence 
is less likely to be met by more favorable terms b ecause once the price 
is pos ted it  canno t be changed until after the buying period is over. 
" Counterspeculation" as present in one sided oral auctions is absent 
under posted prices . 
Resul ts o f  monopoly opera t ing with a pos ted price are reported 
in Smith (1981), The impor tance o f  indus trial s tructure and the interac t io n  
between s tructure and market ins titutions i s  seen b y  s tudying Figure 7 
and comparing the resul t s  with those from o ther monopoly experiment s ,  
e . g . , Figure 3.  A s  can be s een, under the pos ted offer ins titutions 
monopoly behaves exactly as monopoly theory asserts . The monopol is t  
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o f  buyer behavio r), ascertains th e pro f i t  maximi zing price,  sets price
st that l evel,  and leaves i t  ther e. Buyers facing f ixed prices reveal 
their demand func tion. Compared to the oral auc tion the po s t ed o f f er 
ma rket is mechanic a l .  
The po s t ed pr ice ins t i tu t io n  has been used in a l mos t  all  
o l i gopoly exper i ment s ,  The practice was (p erhaps inadve r t ently) introduced
by Fouraker and S iegel ( 1 963). Each su bjec t seller was giv en a pro f i t  
table ind ica t in g  pro f i ts as a func tion o f  own price a n d  t h e  co mpet i tor ' s  
pric e .  Th e sel l ers during a p er io d  chose only a s in gl e  pric e and the 
dec ision wa e irr evoc a bl e .  S inc e a f ixed pro f i t  func t io n  was provided, 
the proc edures i mpl ic i tly assume tha t buyers do no t specula t e  and 
behave ' 'pa s s iv el t' as  und er the po s ted price ins t i tu t io n  • 
Fo r the mos t  pa r t  the bas ic ma rket conditions wer e for 
homogenous commodit ies .  Use of a pro f i t  t a bl e  i mpl i es tha t  the ma rket 
demand func t ion is known with certainty (unlike exper i ment s  discussed 
a bove), Prices a bove a compe t i to r 's pri c e  r esul t in no eal ee and a 
s mall los e. Co at cond i t ions were such that zero pro fits wer e  earned 
at the co mp e t i tive equ i l i brium and price l evel s below this involved a 
loss for a l l  a gents (a f eature added by J. L. Murphy , r ef er enc ed be low). 
The economic inter pr etation wou l d  be one o f  no rent s ,  and one consequence 
of this lack of " producer surplus"  is that prices mus t  necessarily 
a ppro ac h the co mpe t i t iv e  equ i l i brium fro m  " a bov e." Th e ma jor trea t ment 
va ria bl e  in the bas ic economic cond i t ions catego ry was the synrnetry o f  
the payo f f  funct io ns , thus i mpl y ing s omething a bout s i milarity  o f  cos t s  
(for the h omogenous pr oduc t c a s e  t h e  interpreta t ion woul d  be that a l l  
co sts are c ons tant a t  zero), Market s t ruc tures were pr i maril y  duo pol les 
hut tr iopo lles were a lso studied , 
24 
The primar ily ins titutional variable aside from the posted 
price, involved the amount o f  knowledge available to agents. Under 
the Fouraker and S iegel complete informa tion cond ition,  the public 
informa tion was that all agents knew all pas t choice and profits of  
all o ther agents,  In the incomple te informa t ion cond ition,  the public 
informat ion was tha t profits were unknown and an agent only knew 
whether his price was higher o r  lower than competitors.  
If one uses as the market price the lowest price in the market 
(the price at which all trades take place) then Fouraker and Siegel 
discovered a s trong tendency for prices to converge toward the competitive 
equilibr ium. By the fourteenth period the competitive equilibrium price 
prevailed in eleven of seventeen markets and was at the neighboring price 
(the price nearest the competitive equilibrium for f ive more) in the case 
of  incomplete informat ion. The complete information cas e  yielded
convergence in the direction of the competitive equilibrium but prices 
were higher at this fourteenth period s tage, 
In a s tudy by Murphy (1966) a similar d ecay process was observed 
in duopolies operat ing under the incomplete informa tion cond ition, In 
general , however , he found the decay process to be slower with prices 
tend ing to hang somewhat higher above the competitive equilibr ium than d id 
Fouraker and Siegel (at tributed by Murphy to the threat of possible loss 
which was possible in his payoff tables), In add it ion ,  Murphy observed five 
duopolies (ou t  of seventeen) which were able to coord ina te price increases 
which converged to the joint maximum and a sixth was near the joint maximum. 
Convergence to the jo int maximum was no t mono tone , Ins tead , almo s t  all of  
the duopolies experienced the competitive decay a t  f irst and then after 
several p eriods , prices began to drift upwards for those tha t ultimat ely 
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converged to the j o int maximum (the Murphy experimen ts were twenty-four 
periods as opposed to fourteen for Fouraker and Siegel), 
Presumably this " coo perative" phenomenon in duopolists opera ting 
under these conditions is facilitated by many trials and experience. 
The lat ter was explored extens ively by Stoecker (1980) within the same 
parametric and ins titutional environment as Murphy only with complete 
informa t ion, Rather than many p er iods of  a s ingle market S to ecker allowed 
ind ividuals to obtain experience from many markets of ten p eriods each. 
Thir ty-seven out of fifty duopoly markets managed substantial cooperation 
(at or near the joint maximum). None of the remainder exhibited the 
property of  the oral double auction of mono tone convergence to the 
competitive equ ilibrium. Jumps of price were common. 
In Fouraker and Siegel and in S to ecker bo th of the basic 
economic conditions of profit  function symmetry (S to ecker s tudied two 
different types of asymmetry) and the market s tructure ( two , three, and 
five agent markets) were examined. Symmetry results in high market 
prices , Presumably this is because coordinat ion is eas ier--the actions 
of  the o ther can be more clearly understood and there can be no 
disagreement over the joint s trategies. If  both are to charge the 
same price , a unique Pareto op timum exists. An increase in the number 
of f irms almo s t  always results in a convergence of price to levels near 
the competitive equilibrium . However ,  a slight upward bias rela tive to 
the competitive equilibrium even when the number of f irms is "large , "  
appears to b e  part o f  the general propert ies o f  the pos t ed price 
ins ti tu tion. 
The work of Friedman (1963, 1969 , 1970), Hogga t t  (1959, 1967) 
and Dolbear , et al . (1968) has extended the pos ted pr ice research 
ini tiated by Fouraker and Siegel in several directions . In these 
26 
markets , produc ts are no longer homogeneous in the sense that higher 
prices than a competito r ' s result in zero sales and a los s .  As a 
result o f  this innovation the information conditions can be altered . 
Perfect information means that all pro f i t  functions and past price 
choices are known. Incomplete information means that all pas t prices 
(or quantities, as appropriate) are known but only their own prof it 
func tions are known. 
The f indings are best represented in the recent book by Friedman 
and Hoggatt  (1980) which describes the results of several oligopolistic 
markets under varying parametric and infonnation conditio ns. The two 
models are compared: the joint maximum model and the Cournot equilibrium. 
The competitive equilibriums where price equals marginal cos t  are no t 
examined, Of course, the Courno t equilibrium prices are above these 
prices . 
If the markets are charac terized by perfec t information and 
symmetric profit func tions , the joint maximum is a good predic tor for 
markets with up to four sellers ,  For the market with s ix sellers , prices 
dropped substantially to the Courno t equilibrium or jus t above i t .  I f  
symmetry i s  dropped o r  i f  perfect information i s  dro pped,4 the number 
o f  sellers becomes a very important treatment variable. In the duopoly
markets , significant (but less than perfec t) cooperation occurs but with 
an increase in the number of firms it vanishes almos t completely and the 
Courno t model is very accurate by comparison. Friedman and Hoggatt  
conjec ture what S toecker convincingly demons trates that experience 
makes a difference. "New and inexperienced faces" can cause market 
p rices to deteriorate. 
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Thus , for the pos ted price ins titutio n  a pat tern is emerging . 
The ins titution seems to fos ter higher prices in general. Fur thermore, 
under appro priate basic economic conditions and market structures , i t  
can fos ter collusion i n  the sense that the jo int maximizing model is 
an accurate predic tor of pricing pat terns . 
D. Advance No tification and P rice Pro tec tion 
The recent ac t ions taken by the Federal Trade Connnissio n
5 
have drawn attention to the market ins titu tion in the antiknock compound 
6 industry. Industrial prac t ices assure cus tomers o f  a thirty-day advance 
no tice of price changes (increases) .  Prices are quo ted in tenns of  
delivered prices with the same price prevailing regardless of  transpo r tation 
co s t s .  In add i tion, contrac ts typically include a "price pro tec tion" 
clause which guarantees (i) that the seller will sell to no one at a price 
less than the pr ice quo ted the buyer and (ii) the seller will meet any 
lower price in the market or release the buyer from the contrac t .  
The indus try s tructure is charac terized by two large sellers 
of equal size (approximately 35 percent of the market each) and two small 
sellers of about equal size.  A long-run declining demand (due to a 
reduc t io n  in lead use in gasoline) and existing excess capacity discourages 
entry. Eight large buy�s account for about 60 percent o f  the sales and 
many very small buyers account for the res t .  
Plo tt (1981) has explored markets with these propert ies . Each 
agent was ass igned an office. Sellers were able to post prices by means 
o f  a digi tal electronic displ�y sys tem such that price announcements were 
made known immediately to all market agents.  Orders were placed through 
28 
the tel ephone sys tem. Price increases required advance no tice a nd all 
tra nsac tio ns were made a t  advertised prices ( the buyer pro tiec tio n clause 
which precludes d iscounts ) , The i ndus tr ial s tructure was as desc r i bed 
a bove with the market dema nd a nd supply func tio ns as s hown i n  Figure 3 .  
The maj or conclusio n  o f  th is s tudy i s  tha t  these practices when 
co mbined with the indus trial s truc ture cause prices to be a bove those 
tha t  would o therwise ex is t. Figure 8 gives average prices during each 
of seventeen trad i ng perio d s . Ma rket ins ti tu tio ns were a s i mple telepho ne 
market duri ng the f irst twelve perio d s .  A s  ca n be seen, the prices beg i n  
to decay toward the competi tive equ i li br ium.  The practices were i mposed 
for periods 13 through 16. As ca n be seen, pr ices j u mp i mmediately to 
near the Courno t  equ il i brium, When the prac tices were re moved (periods 16 
a nd 17) prices immedia tely f el l . These data are representa tive of the 
pa ttern o f  find ings fro m twe nty-two exper imental markets . 
The theoretical expla natio n o f  this pheno me no n  has so me suppo r t. 
Advance no tice given suffic iently in adva nce o f  the dead l i ne for advance 
no tif icatio n provides a s i g na l  to o ther sellers.  If  the no tice involves 
a price sufficie ntly far in the f u ture,  it induces no current bus i ness 
los s .  Onl y  a singl e  price is i nvolved so the signa l  i s  uncompl ica ted 
with mi ni mal d i mens io ns over which d isagree ment can occur.  Other sel lers 
know tha t  i f  they do not increase prices before the deadl i ne ,  the original 
f inn will resc i nd the proposed price i ncrease,  Thus o ther sellers do no t 
have the o p tion o f  "undersel l i ng" a nd acquiring a larger ma rket shar e .  
The Nash s trategy f o r  such f inne is s i mp ly to ma tch the p roposed p r ice 
if a uni fo nn indus try pr ice a t  the h i gher l evel w i ll i ncrease the firm' s 
pro f i ts and do no th ing o therwise . On the downs id e ,  due to the ho mogenous 










IO 0 I') N 
!!! 
I 















a:: >Ir -m m .... _ 
:::; I -..J .... _ 
a: 
:::> 
� CJ "' 















::> I 2 
)( I.. :I 
'--..J .. u I 0 ..J II- I z 0 L�.., 
Q 
IO � IO � "' 0 2 ,... • I') 
3:ll�d 
30 
be matched , so the incentive to cut prices dep ends upon the anticipa t ed 
share of demand increase due to lower price levels . This model predicts 
tha t prices will cer tainly be at Courno t levels if no t higher . 
These ins titutions seem to have an effect on buyers similar 
to the pos ted price ins titu t ions . Buyers do no t anticipate discounts 
because the ins titutions prevent them, Furthermore,  since any price 
concessions mus t be offered to all, buyers can see tha t price concessions 
can be cos tly to the seller and thus have less expec ta tio n  of winning 
them. As a result,  the buyers seem to have less " counterspeculation" 
than in, say, the telephone markets alone. Thus these inst itutions 
appear to remove one source of buyer pressure for reduced prices while 
at the same time easing the problem of price coordination for the s eller 
and elimina t ing the advantages of price cuts. 
EXTRAMARKET COMMUNICATION 
Communica t ion which facilitates price coordination could 
conceivably take many forms. Many indus trial organization scholars 
f eel that collusion is easy and takes little more than recognition o f  
a harmony o f  interest. O thers feel tha t collusion canno t  be achieved 
without contrac ts , surveillance ,  and sanc t ions. In this sec t ion we 
will review forms of communicat io n  which can carry an offer of collusion, 
Firs t discussed will b e  cases in which such signals mus t  be conveyed 
within the context of the market i tself , I f  agreements evolve,  they 
mus t  be f acilitated in terms of actions without the a id of o rdinary 
language, Following that the results o f  two s tudies , which were des igned 
to s tudy o rganized collusion, will be summarized. 
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A. Signals 
Is it poss ible for natural compet itors such as human s ellers 
to form an alliance withou t the aid of language? Can such alliances 
occur in the absence of any s ignals , threats , etc,  in the s ense tha t 
the context i tself sugges ts collusion? The bes t answer to this ques tion 
appears in the data of S to ecker (1980), Fouraker and Siegel forma t ,  
7perfec t-informa tion,  duopoly experiments were conducted with experienced 
8 par ticipants . Out of fif ty markets (las ting ten periods each) thirty-
seven achieved a rather stable (end of period effects cause some 
ambigui ty in interpretations) equilibrium at or near the jo int maximum . 
Nineteen of the thirty-seven markets attained this coordinated equilibrium 
with no signals or "learning , "  It occurred with the firs t pric e  cho ice 
with bo th compet i tors choo s ing the maximum and for the mos t  part the 
sys tems s tayed there, Thus , in this context , in which the harmony of 
interest  could be clearly ascertained with no room for ambiauity or 
confusion,  some duopolies needed no means of communicating intentio ns 
at all, For a subset (eighteen) of these fif ty duopolies the joint 
maximum was no t the individual maximum given equal prices. Of these , 
thir teen achieved s table equilibrium near the joint maximum and of the 
thir teen there were four which attained the equilibrium wi th the first 
move.  Since these duopolists had twenty prices to choose from, i t  would 
be d iff icult to ascribe these coordinated actions to chance ,  
Within o ther indus trial s t ruc tures and market ins titutions 
thus far explored ,  the exis t ence of any one of (i) a harmony of interes t ,  
(ii) a recognized a t temp t t o  collude, or  (iii) even a "fo cal point" is 
no t a sufficient condition fo r collusion,  Market signals o ccur cons tantly 
in o ral double auc tions. After a contrac t ,  when the market is open for b ids 
3 2  
o r  o f f ers, t he b idding wil l so met i mes start  with a c lea r ly unacc epta ble bid
( e.g., a 1 c ent b id o r  so met hing far below any pr eviously acc ept ed pr ice) 
and i t  will o f t en be followed by simila r  b id e  from o t her buyers who er e 
ind icat ing a wi llingness to keep prices low. When this ha ppens , s ellers 
er e no t pa ss i ve. Suc h  bid e  may b e  answered by an equa lly ridiculous 
set o f  o f f ers f ro m  sellers indicat ing t hat t he o t her aide can play 
tha t  ga me too ,  However, even i f  t her e is no answer, t he s ellers do 
no t sel l .  They simply wai t  ( count ers pecu la t e) es t he co mpet i t ion 
between buyer s  s lowly wo rks the b id e  into t he previously acc ept ed 
range, Signals suc h  as t hes e never s eem to work in t he double auc t ion 
inetitu�ion o r  i f  t hey do t he ef f ec t ivenes s i s  no t i mmed i a t ely o b vious. 
Bo t h  t he Plo t t  and Uhl ( 1981 ) end the I ssac a nd P lo t t  ( 198 lb) 
se wel l  ae t he Smi t h  and W illiams (1981 )  experi ment s  a re i n t er est ing 
in this reeepc t .  The fo rmer invo lved s set o f  midd lemen who bought 
and sol d  in spa t ially separa t ed markets. The l a t t er t wo  pa pers invo lve 
a price c ei l ing ( f loo r) sl ightly a bo ve (b elow) t he equi li briwn. The 
ha rmony o f  int erest in t he f irs t study and t he " foca l po i nt s" in t he 
second two stud i es were obvious, y et t he ma rket s converged to n ea r  t he 
co mpet i t i ve equ i l i brium w i t h  no eigne of i mplicit  co llu sion o r  co nsc ious 
para lleli sm o f  ac tions. In these stud ies with four s ell ers and t he o ra l  
suc t ion ins t i t u t ion t here was n o  sign o f  t he coo rdina t ion pos s i bi li t i es 
demons t ra t ed by Sto ecker. 
Ho gga t t ,  F ri ed man , end G i ll ( 19 76) end Fr i ed ma n  and Hogga t t  
( 1 9 80) pro vid e the only a t t empt s t o  mod el t he signaling pheno menon. 
In pa rt signa ls er e vi ewed as a t t en t ion g et t ing d evic es . 1-tis t of t he 
work is an a t t empt to identify a s igna l a e  something d i st inc t bur i ed in 
t he mas ses of da ta of the ord inary s earc hing and co mpet ing pr ic e d ec i sions, 
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Wit hin the pos t ed price ins t itution high o r  l o w  pr ices ha ve en i mmed ia t e  
ef f ec t  o n  pro f i t s  so , a s  o n e  might ex pec t ,  signal s occur rar ely rela t i ve 
to o t her d ecisions . Signals a re identi f i ed a e  a ty pe o f  " pulse" in which 
an a brupt change o f  beha vio r occurs for a brief period ( a  sudden large 
pr ice increase o r  d ec rea se) fo llowed by a r eturn to t he o riginal l evels. 
Fri ed man and Hogga t t  ha ve a t t empt ed to d evelo p mod els which will relat e 
t hi s  ac t i vity  to o vera ll pr ice chang es and /o r  pric e  levels. AB o f  t hi s
wri ting t hey ha ve a r easonable characterization o f  t he phenomenon 
bu t f eel i t  happens eo inf requent ly in t hei r data t ha t  t he implica t ions 
canno t be ascertained .  
Da ta g en era t ed i n  a "semi pos t ed price" ma rket pro vid e so me 
ins i g hts into how s ignaling mig ht occur and b e  usef u l, The'inet i t u t ion 
is a ma rket wi t h  ad vert i sing (by en elec tronic d ig i ta l  d i splay sy st em) 
1 wi t h  s s t i pu la t ion t ha t  ell sa les a re a t  advert i sed prices. A " price 
war" has r eac hed a low po int i n  period 5 (:!<"i gu re 9 ) ,  No t ice t he 
existence o f  ad verti sing b efore period 5 o pen s, P ri c es cave soon 
a f t er t he ma rket o pens and cont inue downward during t he period wi t h  
a lmo s t  all transac t ions (no t  shown) mad e  a t  t he low pric es, Buy ers 
s eemed to be count ers pecula t ing until pric es f el l .  The period end s 
but signaling begins wi t h  very hig h  prices being a d verti sed when i t  
co st s no t hing t o  d o  eo b efo re period 6 b eg ins . The period sta rt s and 
price cut t ing begins immed i a t ely but t he sel l ers who signaled hig h  
prices meet pr ice c u t s  t hi s  t ime rather t hen cu t t ing b elow.  As a 
r es u lt the s peed o f  pri c e  d ecay le reduced and in t he end t ransactions 
occur at so mewha t incr ea sed prices .  No t ic e  t ha t  t he two signaling 
ind i vidua ls ha ve t hei r pric es hig h before the period end s ( having li mit ed 
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Prior to period 7 all adver tised prices are a t  a high level and the decay 
is les s .  This process continues a s  prices creep upward fo r several 
periods . Of course these data are not demons trations that price signals 
can affec t prices but they are cer tainly suggestive of how it might 
happen. They are also typical of  a general tendency for s ignals to 
o ccur through channels and at t imes when such communica tion is no t 
cos tly , 
B .  Auction Markets 
The effectiveness of preperiod discussio ns by s ellers (buyers) 
on prices in a double auction market was explo red by Isaac and Plo t t  
(198la) . The four sellers (buyers) were allowed t o  talk freely between 
periods while the buyers (sellers) lef t the room to get the next p er iod ' s  
demand (co s t) func tio ns .  No side payments o r  pro f i t  shar ing discussions 
were allowed . 
The study asked the following ques tions . Do traders discuss 
collusion when g iven the oppor tunity? Can the traders formulate some 
sort of agreement? Once formulated , do they s t ick to i t ?  Can the 
consequences of the conspiracy be detected in the industrial conduct? 
The answer to the f irs t two ques tions is yes , The answers 
to the second two are no t without qualificatio ns . Data in Figure 10 
provide a comparison with the oral double auct ion when no collusion 
is present ( the f ir s t  three experiments) , with tho s e  in which there 
is a s ell er ' s  conspiracy (the four th and fif th) and a buyer ' s  conspiracy 
(the six t h  and seventh). The top charts are the average prices each 
period . The middle char ts are the per period volumes and the bo ttom 
charts  are the efficiencies , 
In order to see the effects , it is impor tant to no tic e  the 
near mono tone convergence of all three measures in the f irs t three 
nonconspirato rial markets . Prices , volume, and eff iciency , all three 
move mono tonically to the competitive equilibrium l evels . This does 
no t happen in the conspiracy markets . In each of the four experiments 
with conspiracy, with the po ssible exception of experiment I I I ,  at least  
one  o f  these measures exhibits some erratic behavior in  the  sense o f
a movement away from equilibrium . In this sense the conspiracy might 
be detectable f rom marke t data,  but experiment III indicat es the 
diff icul ty . No tice in experiment III there is a s trong tendency toward 
the competi tive levels even though there is an ac tive conspiracy . 
Figure 11 will help explain what is happening. Shown there 
is the sequence o f  b id s ,  offers , and contracts from experiment III.  
This experiment involved the drama tic reductio n  in prices in period 4 
as a result o f  a successful buyer ' s  conspiracy . 
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Some general discussion began af ter p eriod 3. No t e  tha t ,  unlike 
period 3, the buyers in period 4 did no t rush to accep t high seller 
o f fers . In p erio d  3, f ive of the f irst  six trades were offers
between 83 cents and 88 cent s .  In period 4,  no o f f ers were accepted 
until they reached 73 cent s .  I n  period 5 ,  the tenth b id was a t  
7 2  cents , Between periods 5 and 6 the sellers agreed t o  try to 
hold the price at 71 cents . In perio d  6 ,  the first twenty-seven 
b ids were all either at 70 cents or 71 cents , with s everal inter­
vening offers at 72 cents ignored . The twenty-eighth b id broke the 
agreement , and there were ten immediat e  trades at 72 cents . 
Of par t icular interes t in this contex t are the high o ff ers in period 5 .  
These are interpreted a s  signals b y  sellers a s  a n  a t t emp t t o  get o ther 
sellers to hold out . Frequently , however ,  they are made by sellers 
who have already sold and now have only high cos t  units which they do 
not expect to s ell . The cos t  of signaling to them is low. Nevertheles s ,  
the fac t  that the nonconspira tors a r e  no t simply passive i s  obvious.  
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The diff icul ty these conspirators have in substantially 
affecting market conduc t·  seems to be related to the market ins titutional 
environment . As the Smith resul ts reviewed above demons trate,  even a 
perfect conspiracy (monopoly) has difficul ty in the double auction.  
Add this property o f  auc tion markets to  the fac t that duopolis ts can 
have difficul ty in achieving coordination even under the mo s t  favo rable 
conditions as was discussed above . Perhaps then it is not surpris ing 
that the indus trial s truc ture used in the Isaac and Plo t t  experiments 
(four buyers and four sellers) would make successful conspiracy difficul t .  
C .  Pos ted Prices 
If  the market ins titutions are the po s t ed price and the 
indus trial s truc ture is duopoly , a completely different pic ture 
emerges . Friedman (1967 , 1970) s tudied po s t ed prices o f  duopolies wj th 
asymmetric payoff  func tions . Perfec t informa tion exis ted in the sense 
that each competitor knew all previous price choices and payoffs (up to 
a scalar transformation on occasion) .  Competitors were allowed to 
. transmit two wri tten messages before privately making a price decisio n ,  
These messages were made i n  sequence with the same individual initia ting 
contact for each of up to twenty-five periods (although mos t  were f rom 
six to fourteen) . In his data collusive agreements were a t tained in 
over 7 5  percent of all decisions made and of the collusive agreements 
75 percent were Pareto op timal rela tive to the pair (no side payments 
were allowed). The abil ity to make such agreements increases with 
experienc e ,  Once a collusive agreement has been a t tained and 
successiully implemented , the probability of another successful 
agreement is . 96 .  
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Extramarket communica tion does have implications for market 
conduc t ,  Perhaps this is no surprise for those who have observed 
industry fo r years bu t these s tudies demons trate the truth of the 
propo si tion fo r those who have no t had the benefit of such observa tion 
or believe that the "competi tive drive to defect" is so s trong that
collusion is impossibl e .  However ,  the implica tions in terms of  conduct 
canno t be divorced from bo th indus trial s tructure and the market 
ins titutional environment . 
CLOS ING REMARKS 
Experimental studies demons t rate clearly that market ins t itut ions 
and practices can influence market performance . Variables traditionally 
classified as aspects of industrial s tructure are also of demons trable 
importance , Furthermore , rather s tandard mathema tical models are able to 
cap ture much of what can be observed behaviorally . 
Three models do well : the competitive equilibrium, the Courno t 
model , and the monopoly { j o int maximization) model . Some t endency exists 
for the error o f  the model to be s ensitive to struc tural and ins t itutional 
variables { e . g . , pos ted prices tend to be higher than prices under o ral 
double auc tions) but generally speaking , when a model appl ies , it does 
so with reasonable accuracy . 
Interes tingly enough, while experimental s tudies d emonstrate  
that i t  is  possible to  model economic processes , they have also uncovered 
a problem in determining the conditions under which a model will be 
appl icabl e .  There i s  a n  interact ion between variables which has no t 
been fully explained . It is no t the case that competitors are capable 
of  collusive activ ity when merely recognizing a harmony of interes ts . 
41 
I t  is also no t the case that competito rs canno t collude in the absence 
of  direct communication and the enforcement of agreements , Competitors
9 seem to be willing to collude (so the rivalis t ic hypo theses advanced
in the early experimental s tudies can be safely dropped) but  some 
industrial s t ruc tures and market inst i tutions make it easy whil e o thers 
make it almo s t  impo ssible ( in the s ense that successful collusion has 
never been observed) . Even a monopol is t has diff iculty within cer tain 
market ins titutions . Existing theory does no t tell us exac tly why this 
occur s ,  but the data sugges t that one key is the behavior of the buyers . 
The data also suggest tha t market p er formance is very fragile with 
respect to these underlying variables and that "s light" changes ( from 
four to two f irms , or from price pos t ing to some other ins titut ion) can 
switch a market from "competitive" to "collus ive" or vice versa . 
One maj or question which experimental s tudies have no t addressed 
is the evolutio n  of the market ins titutions themselves . What type o f  
market ins titutional environment might one expect for a given indus trial 
structure? The data sugges t the nonneutrali ty of  the market ing practices 
so one might expect that self-interested individuals who realize the 
relationships and have an oppor tunity to affect market ins titutio ns 
would do so . To the extent that market institutions are part o f  market 
conduc t ,  indus trial organization economis ts have a clear interes t in 
this questio n .  Perhaps the reason that this issue has no t been addressed 
reflects the fact tha t the independent influence o f  ins titu t ions is o nly 
now being realized . No doub t this vo id will be filled as theory is 
developed which will sugges t wha t one should look for in an experimental 
environment . 
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The s tudies reviewed above were all designed and executed to 
answer reasonably specific ques tions generally rela ted to basic science,  
Sometimes applied sc ientists dismiss the experimental resul ts and 
methods as being irrelevant and inappl icable,  In the remaining paragraphs 
four of the most commo n sources of  skeptic ism will be discussed .  
The f irs t argument is a claim that " real" businessmen d o  no t 
behave as do the subj ects in these experiments . S ta ted l ike this the 
argument is no t a c r iticism of experimental methods,  it is a hypo thesis 
about behavior in diff erent subj ect pools and is thus a call for mor e  
experiments (with bus inessmen subj ects) , Similarly,  arguments tha t the 
amounts involved were too l ittle (or too much) are simply demands for 
mor e  experiments .  The fact o f  the mat ter is , however , tha t a variety 
of subj ects and payment levels have been used . The Hong and Plo t t  ( 1981) 
s tudy , for example ,  used employed adul ts . To date no subj ect pool 
differences have been repor ted . 
The next three arguments derive from the fact that naturally 
occurring phenomena are inherently more complex than are labora to ry 
processes . The firs t argument is tha t the laboratory environment is 
ar tific ial.  Exactly why is  no t articulated but with this argument the 
word is used many times and preferably loudly . I t  probably resul ts f rom 
a ges tal t view tha t  there are so many impor tant variables that they 
canno t be enumerated and that they interact in ways that are necessarily 
precluded in the labora tory . 
This argument ,  no tice,  is no t an argument agains t experimental 
methods in economics , it is an argument agains t experimental methods 
in general . The phys ical scientists mus t  deal with it and so mus t the 
economis ts , Since the assertion canno t be fals ified , the only answer 
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lies in ex per i ments! work t ha t  hes been helpfu l  in g en erat ing successful 
mod els end po ints o f  v i ew r egard ing mo r e  co mplex proc esses, As a ppli ed 
r esearchers f ind the date f ro m  ex per i ment s  u seful in shaping their own 
hy po theses end b elief s, t his argu ment beco mes less i mportan t .  
The second argu ment i s  mor e  spec i f i c  in tha t  i t  no t es that 
na tura lly occurr ing proc esses do no t occur i n  iso la t ion. Industri es 
ere emb ed d ed in a larger soc i a l  co ntex t ,  Bu sinessmen ha ve soc i a l  
r ela t ionships end f r i end ships. They a lso know tha t  t heir d ec i sions 
while with one f irm may e f f ec t  t heir po ssib i li t i es fo r c hanging f irms. 
Th i e  a rgu ment suggest s tha t  beha vior in very co mplex 
environments may fo llow d i f fer en t  laws t han t ho se whi c h  go vern 
b ehavior in r ela t iv ely si mple si tua tions. Th i e  is en exc ellent r ea son 
for b eing caref u l  in any a t t empt to ex trapo la t e  beha vio r fro m a 
labo ra tory to a co mplex indu stry , No t i c e, however , t ha t  i t  i s  no t an 
a rgument against experi mental methods. I t  ia an argu ment for a par t icular 
type o f  experiment--on e  in whic h t he co mplex i t y  o f  the ex perimenta l 
env ironment i e  gradua lly increa sed si milar to tho se o f  a g.i ven indu stry, 
If compli ca t ions destroy t he a pplicability of mod els, it mig ht b e  po ssible 
to i d entify  the pr eci se co mpli ca t ions whi c h  cause t he problem end adj ust 
t he mod el accord ingly .  I n  a sense thi s  progra m o f  inc rea sing co mplex i ty 
i s  exa c t ly how exper i ment s  are proc eed ing, 
The f ina l criticism a lso r elies on t he co mplex i ty of natura lly 
occurr ing proc esses. How is  one to know if t he ela st ic i ty o f  d emand 
end cost s used in en ex per i men t or if the pa rt icular market inst i tu t ion 
a re t hose of  the indu stry? I f  the result s  of  t he laboratory exper i ment s
e r e  to be a ppli ed ,  shou ldn ' t  t hese b e  "r igh�' ? The answer to t hese 
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ty pes o f  c r i t i c i sms are sti ll mor e  ex peri ments under varying para met er s. 
Wi th  a wid e rang e o f  paramet er s ex plo r ed ,  t he question co llapses into a 
j udgment abou t para met er s end no t t he ex per imenta l  met hods, 
All of t hese ergumen t e  should make one caut ious about 
ex trapo la t ing r esu lts genera t ed from labo ratory proc esses to natura lly 
occurring proc esses. Thie ty pe o f  ex t ension mu st b e  d ea lt with 
artfully in t he physical sc i enc es e s  well ee in econo mics, It  is  
the mo st d i f f icu lt task tha t  a ny r esearc her fec es, Exper i men t s  ere 
si mply en add i t ional source o f  date  and ex per i enc e t ha t  one add s to 
o t her sources in making judgment s  about how the wo r ld works.
An ea si er task invo lv es a so mewha t  negative a pproach plac ing 
t he burd en o f  proo f  on t hose who advoca t e  theories, G enera l t heor i es 
apply i n  spec ia l  ca ses, They should t her efore b e  ex pec t ed to work in 
t he simple laboratory environmen t s  end i f  t hey do no t o r  i f  a cc mpet ing
t heo ry works b et t er ,  t he burd en of proo f i e  on t he advoca t e  to t ell u e  
exa c t ly why w e  should no t j ud g e  hi m t o  b e  wrong. By adop t ing thi s  po int 
o f  v i ew ,  r esearc her s can use date fro m laboratory econo mic s  to r educ e 
t he siz e  o f  t he set o f  co mpet ing ideas, 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Experimental Reeu l t e
For t ho se who a r e  unfamiliar w i t h  l a borato ry exp er im ental 
met hods, a br ief d escrip tion should hel p .  The ba sic tool is t he 
theory o f  induc ed pref er enc e (Smith, 1 9 7 6) . Eac h individual buy er ,  i ,  
i s  g iv en · a  func t ion, Ri (xi) ind icating t he amount o f  money s ( he) may 
col l ec t  f rom t he exp er iment er expr essed aa a func t io n  o f  t he number 
o f  uni t e, x i ' o f  an a bstrac t conunodity e( he) purcha sed dur ing a p eriod . 
The pro f i t s  for t he individual a r e  t he d i f f er enc es between t he r ed emp t ion 
values and t he purcha se pric es, ( I n  mo a t  stud i es a commi ssion of 10 c ents  
or so i s  paid in add i t ion to  t he r ed emption valu es, Howev er ,  t he max imum 
ClR(xi ) price an individual can pay i s  d eclared by t he experimenter to be �-a�- . )  x i 
Thu s, if an individual pref er s  mor e  money to l ess and i f  t he only va lue 
der ived f rom t he a bstrac t commo d i ty is f rom its r esa l e  val ue, t he func tion 
() Ri (x i) measu r es t he l imit  p r ic es o f  ind iv idual i .  
Co et func t ions are induced similarly for sell ers. That i s, 
i ' eac h  sel l er ,  i ,  i s  g iven a func t ion C ( x i) ind icat ing t he co st s( he) 
will incur with sal es o f  xi ' Pro f i t s  are t he d i f f er enc es between r ev enues
ac (xi ) and costs. Thu s, acco rd ing to the compet i t iv e  mod el ��� is t he ( inverse) Clx i 
supply func t ion for i .  
I f  t he laws o f  econom i c s  apply i n  g eneral , then t hey should 
apply to thi s  simple ma rket a s  wel l .  The p eopl e are r eal , The inc en t ives 
are r eal . The a bstract commo d ity now ha s va l u e  by virtue o f  the fact 
t ha t  paym ents can be su bstantial and by virtue o f  the t heory o f  d eriv ed 
demand . The commodity is sc arc e. The fact t hat the m arket is simpl e 
by com par ison to i t s  na tural counterpa r t s  does no t mean t ha t  the behavior 
is simpl e. Nev er thel ess the simpl ic ity  should r einforc e our exp ec ta t ion 
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t ha t  mod el s  and t heor i es which are being appl i ed in t ho se compl ica t ed 
cores should wo rk well ind eed when appl i ed to t he simp l e  ones, 
One need only inqu i r e  now a bout mod el s which accura t el y  
predict  t he o bserved conduc t .  Al l prices and incomes a r e  o bserva ble, 
E f f ic i ency can be measured as t he standard consumer ' s plus produc er ' s  
surplus, E f f i c i ency in t hi s  sense i s  100 per c en t  i f  and only i f  
par t ic ipants max im ize total earning s ( extract t he max imum possi bl e 
f rom t he exper imenter ) .  Thu s, som e  o f  t he maj or economic d imensions 
of indust rial p erformance can be assessed , 
See Research in Experimental  Economics, vol , 2 ,  edi t ed by Vernon L.
Smi t h ,  Gr eenwich, Conn . : JAI Press, forthcoming, which cont ains several 
papers on sealed bid processes. 
This study involved a sl ight variant of t he oral double auct ion . Bids 
and o f f er s  wer e  l ef t  open until accep t ed or c hanged .  Thu s t he market 
inst itut ions wer e  similar to a doubl e  o ra l  auc t ion wi t h  l im i t  order s  
and a n  open book. 
Informat ion in Do l bear ,  et al . d id no t hav e a m easura bl e  ef f ec t .  
Su bsequent exp er im ents suggest t hs t  t he payo f f  a used in thi s  exp eriment 
wer e  so small ( S  c ents  d i f f er enc e i n  pro f its between Cournot equ i l i brium 
and monopoly) t ha t  t he influenc e o f  sny var i a bl es would be ha rd to 
d et ec t .  Nevert heless, t he ds ta t end to be very close and just a bove 
the Courno t eq u il i br ium snd t he qua l i ta t ive influenc e of o t her variabl es 
i s  consi st ent wi t h  t ho se o f  la t er stud ies. 
5 , The Federal Trad e  Commission co mplaint against E t hy l ,  DuPont , PPG, 
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and Nalco Chemical Co mpany (Ethyl Co rporation,  et a l. Docket No . 9 1 28) . 
6. The produc t is added to gaso l ine by r ef iner s  to r educ e knock and raise 
gasoline octane rating.
7 .  The industrial organization analog is a duo poly wit h  a ho mogenous 
produc t ,  po st ed price market s wit h  simula t ed buyers, and publicly 
known pro f it s  and pri c es. 
8 .  The subj ec t s  had pa r t ic ipa t ed i n  a t  lea st one o t her duo poly ex per i men t .  
9.  Thia hypo t hesi s maintained t ha t  co mpetitors will a t t empt to max i mi z e  
r elativ e  pro f it s  t her eby t ransforming t he market into a z ero su m ga me. 
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